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Background: Substandard drugs have long been a major human health problem in developing countries, and
similar issues also beset the veterinary drug industry. Although less immediately costly to human life, the failure of
veterinary treatment can be devastating for pastoralist livelihoods.
Research on this problem has tended to be scientific, focussing on the prevalence and potential consequences of
poor-quality products. In contrast, the social processes by which such products are traded and used have received
far less scholarly attention. This study takes the case of animal African trypanosomiasis, one of Africa's most important
cattle diseases, and uses interviews and focus groups to follow drugs as they pass through the supply chain from
importers and distributors to vendors and customers.
Results: Each set of actors uses different strategies to mitigate the risks of substandard drugs. For instance, pastoralists
experiment carefully with suspect products before using them across their herds, whilst drug vendors and cattle
owners try to invest in relationships with one another. These efforts of building reputation and trust, however, are
hampered by the elusive nature of substandard drugs. Drug quality is impossible to gauge visually, and the treatment
failure that substandard drugs can produce also has other causes, confusing the issue.
Conclusion: Nigerian regulators are beginning to address this problem. A keen understanding of the strengths (efficiency
and reach into rural areas) and weaknesses (difficulties in identifying fake and substandard products) of the veterinary
drug marketplace should underpin their response to this issue.
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In a focus group held in a village in Plateau State in
Nigeria's middle belt, livestock owners reflected on the
quality of veterinary drugs available to them. In particu-
lar, they were concerned about drugs to treat the cattle
disease trypanosomiasis:
‘Before the drugs used to be strong, now you can't predict
which ones will work’ (interview with a Fulani cattle
owner in his 40s, in Maiyanga, Plateau State, 29 April
2014)
Cattle owners went on to discuss their disappointment
with the veterinary drugs they bought from nearby towns
or the small shop in the neighbouring village. There was a
consensus that over the last ten years, but especially overCorrespondence: pete.kingsley@ed.ac.uk
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in any medium, provided the original work is pthe last five, poor-quality products had become increasingly
commonplace and that identifying efficacious drugs
had become a lottery.
These cattle owners are the endpoint of Nigeria's vet-
erinary drug supply chain. At the opposite end of this
chain are the importers and manufacturers of veterinary
drugs, many located in Lagos, 700 km away. The CEO of
one of Nigeria's largest importers reflected that drugs to
treat trypanosomiasis, once a mainstay of his business,
were being swamped by dubious new products:
‘They are the largest selling class of cattle drugs in
Nigeria. Trypanocides used to form a large part of our
turnover, but in the last three or four years, it has
plunged. And in the last five years, all sorts of
trypanocides have come into the country, from Asian
countries, China, India, Egypt, The Middle East, all sorts
of trypanocides, very cheap, we don't know whether they
are effective or not.’ (interview in Lagos, 15 April 2014)pen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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positions, cattle owners and senior industry figures
described similar concerns about a sharp rise in the
presence of dubious products in this supply chain.
This paper explores this apparent recent escalation in
veterinary drug quality problems by examining how such
drugs are bought and sold.
Whilst almost all parties agree that a long-standing
problem has metastasised into a major crisis over the
last few years, there is a marked lack of clarity regarding
the scale and origins of this problem. Furthermore, dif-
ferent actors conceive the problem in different ways, which
in turn emphasises different potential remedies. Scientific
and veterinary research, often in the form of small-scale
exploratory studies, has identified the presence of poor-
quality veterinary products (Wanyangu et al. 1996; Van
Wyk et al. 1997; Teko-Agbo et al. 2008; Gberindyer et al.
2014). Other research has described in structural terms
the veterinary medicine industries in various African
countries (Grasswitz et al. 2004) and the legal frameworks
for regulating those sectors (Kané 2008).
However, remarkably little attention has been paid to
the actual workings of veterinary supply chains - that is,
social ties forged in negotiation, trust and self-interest
which are required to move medicines between places and
people. As the state has largely withdrawn from the
provision of veterinary services, actors at all stages of
the supply chain have been forced to adapt. Like many
other Nigerian industries, in part this means coping with
the lack of a state that can reliably enforce contracts and
the consequent low levels of trust between actors in differ-
ent stages of the supply chain - a phenomenon long dis-
cussed in African settings (e.g. Widner and Mundt 1998;
Zak and Knack 2001). Such situations can be especially
acute for livestock owners who are likely to be involved in
trading patterns involving mobile vendors and buyers,
as well as ‘long distances, and delayed payment in the
absence of adequate financial institutions’ (van Ufford and
Zaal 2004: 121).
Collating perceptions of drug quality from various lo-
cations in the supply chain emphasises the multiplicity
of the problem and the different foci of various actors.
Global pharmaceutical companies, international importers
and distributors and, to a lesser extent, regional whole-
salers generally frame the drug quality issue in terms
of criminality and law enforcement - a problem is
rogue products and providers, requiring a solution of
more active regulation. These providers, however, along
with regional wholesalers and local vendors of drugs also
suggest that a major problem is the poor veterinary
practices of the Fulani, the ethnic group who own the
vast majority of Nigeria's cattlea. It is alleged that
these cattle owners incorrectly administer drugs in a
variety of ways causing treatment failures that aredifficult to distinguish from those caused by poor drug
quality.
Interviews and focus groups with cattle owners con-
firm that non-standard veterinary practices are common-
place. However, far from being ignorant and backward, as
much derogatory rhetoric from elsewhere in the drug sup-
ply chain (and more broadly across urban and southern
Nigeria) implies, the Fulani are fully aware of problems
with drug quality and pursue active and innovative strat-
egies to mitigate the financial and health risks involved. In
a sense, the substandard drug problem destabilises con-
ventional assumptions about veterinary expertise. Parts
of the pharmaceutical industry may well be producing
incorrectly formulated drugs, whilst pockets of informal
and uncertified veterinary knowledge can be found in
unexpected places.
Reflecting on the nature of the veterinary drug supply
chain has a number of implications. An entire supply
chain has emerged that is unregulated, informal, yet lu-
crative, highly organised and an important part of one of
Nigeria's most important industries. Given the scale of
this industry, an enforcement-based solution to drug
quality is likely to be difficult to implement. Instead, the
problem needs to be understood as three interrelated
issues - the emergence of dubious products into the
marketplace, the decline (or even collapse) of formal
veterinary services in rural areas and the structural neg-
lect of cattle owners.
There are a number of apparently straightforward strat-
egies for securing better drug quality that seem difficult
to pursue or sustain. Cattle owners could pool their re-
sources, informally or as part of cooperatives, to buy
drugs from more distant but reputable vendors. Drug
vendors could be trained to identify fake and counterfeit
drugs and to store their products correctly. National au-
thorities are belatedly investigating the issue - but could
have done so vigorously at a much earlier date. The vari-
ous reasons for these missed opportunities - particularly
regarding the difficulty in building a reputation for selling
good-quality products when that quality is hard to prove -
are discussed.
The failure to develop a more secure supply chain re-
flects different priorities in tackling the problem. For
pharmaceutical companies, the problem is the economic
threat posed by counterfeit and substandard products of
all kinds. For cattle owners, however, the problem of
drug quality is one part of the much broader challenge
of securing animal health. A deeper issue, however, is
the political and cultural marginality of cattle owners in
general, but particularly the Fulani people. The lack of
government attention to these issues even as campaigns
against other counterfeit products have been successful re-
flects the low priority given to these often-impoverished,
rural-dwelling cattle owners. This is evident generally in a
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specific places like Plateau State where contentious polit-
ical disputes further hamper the ability of the Fulani to
seek government assistance. Thus, the issue of drug qual-
ity is driven by inadequate veterinary practices and un-
scrupulous vendors and manufacturers, but is sustained
by a general disconnection and disdain for the Fulani,
which is palpable in many areas of Nigerian life.
This paper begins by reviewing previous attempts to
tackle substandard drugs, particularly for human drugs
where efforts have been more intensive. It then intro-
duces a methodology for exploring this ambiguous and
often clandestine problem. The empirical material pre-
sented begins with an institutional history of veterinary
drug control in Nigeria, before presenting the findings of
interviews and focus groups with suppliers, distributors,
vendors and customers. It concludes by reflecting on the
implications of these findings - both for understanding the
functioning of Nigerian markets and for potential remed-
ies to the problem.Substandard drugs
In treatment for humans, falsified and substandard drugs
have for some time been seen as a major public health
problem, particularly in low-income countries (Fernandez
et al. 2008). A broad range of actors, from the WHO and
transnational pharmaceutical companies to national and
local distributors, regulatory authorities, physicians, phar-
macists and patients, have been enrolled in tackling this
issue (Dégardin et al. 2014). However, clarifying the defin-
ition, nature and scale of the problem has proved to be a
challenging and controversial task.
The WHO resolved to address the issue of ‘falsely la-
belled, spurious, counterfeited or substandard’ medicines
in 1988 (Burci 2013), which evolved into the current cat-
egory of ‘substandard/spurious/falsely-labelled/falsified/
counterfeit medical products’ (WHO 2011). As this un-
wieldy definition implies, it is an expansive category that
covers a broad spectrum of possibilities ranging from ma-
licious criminality (such as the selling of outright fakes
or even toxic products) to unintended quality issues that
emerge in manufacturing, storage and distribution.
A particularly important definitional issue with substand-
ard drugs has been the status of generic drugs. Pharma-
ceutical companies have been accused of conflating the
problem of substandard products with the use of generics
(Shukla and Sangal 2009), that is, copies of ‘brand name’
drugs that are no longer protected by patents. Some ge-
nerics may well be of poor quality - a fact that brand name
pharmaceutical companies are keen to point out - but
many generics are of comparable quality with their ‘brand
name’ counterparts (Newton et al. 2011). By muddying the
waters in this way, pharmaceutical companies have beenaccused of hijacking efforts to tackle a public health prob-
lem in order to protect their own products (Clift 2010).
Thus, pharmaceutical companies and regulators in de-
veloping countries tend to approach the substandard
drug problem in ways that overlap, but also differ signifi-
cantly. And, as the WHO argues:
‘The absence of а universally accepted definition not
only makes information exchange between countries
very difficult but it also limits the ability to
understand the true extent of the problem at global
level.’b
Regulators may equate ‘substandard and fake’ with ‘un-
registered and ineffective’, whilst pharmaceutical compan-
ies may emphasise ‘in violation of intellectual property
rules and ineffective’. This tension between commercial
and public health approaches to the drug quality issues in
part frames the options available to Nigerian regulators - a
subject discussed further in the conclusion of this paper.
As well as definitional issues, there are also serious
shortcomings in the evidence base regarding substand-
ard drugs. Despite broad agreement that drug quality is-
sues are a major problem, ‘there is still surprisingly little
basic research data to support widely repeated claims
about the prevalence of drug counterfeiting’ (Seear et al.
2011: 488). For counterfeiting specifically, the clandes-
tine and criminal nature of some of the actors involved
hampers research. For the broader problem of drug qual-
ity, the cost and technical difficulty of drug testing make
regular, widespread surveys of the problem difficult. A
systematic review notes that many studies of substandard
drug prevalence have been highly limited in their scope or
subject to less-than-ideal sampling methods (Almuzaini
et al. 2013). Notwithstanding these shortcomings, what
research that has been conducted confirms the serious
nature of the problem. One review of human drugs sug-
gests that globally ‘up to 15% of all sold drugs are fake’
(Cockburn et al. 2005), whilst some especially alarming
studies have described markets in which more than half of
all anti-malarial drugs on sale contain no active ingredient
(Dondorp et al. 2004).
In many ways, the veterinary drug sector faces similar
problems but as a research topic has been even more
neglected. The International Federation for Animal Health
reports that the trade in unregistered and substandard
veterinary drugs is worth $400 million annually - a size
similar to the legitimate market (FAO 2012). Other
disease-specific studies have warned of the availability
of fake products (e.g. Melaku and Birasa 2013), whilst
other research has subjected samples purchased to labora-
tory testing (e.g. Chaka et al. 2009; Gberindyer et al. 2014).
Importantly, substandard products which contain some
active ingredient but at a lower-than-specified level ‘are
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greatly increase the risk of drug resistance developing’
(Geerts et al. 2001: 28; see also Waller et al. 1996: 184).
As well as the direct harm caused by poor drug quality
and treatment failure, many industry actors interviewed
emphasised that a large market for substandard or fake
products acted as a major disincentive for the development
of new products. A preponderance of fake and substandard
products might even imperil the continued manufacturing
of genuine drugs, should those ‘brand name’ drugs con-
tinue to lose ground in the marketplace.
Whilst human health has understandably been priori-
tised in interventions to address drug quality issues, vet-
erinary drugs are a vital part in some of Africa's most
important industries. Large numbers of Africans rear cat-
tle as a key part of their livelihood, and many more own
animals as a supplement to their main household income
(Thornton et al. 2002). As is well known, cattle often per-
form important additional social and economic functions
beyond the meat and dairy products they provide, such as
acting as forms of savings, insurance and draught power
(e.g. McPeak et al. 2011: 10–43).
Trypanosomiasis and Nigeria
To explore these issues, this paper focusses on a specific
country, Nigeria, and a specific cattle disease, animal
African trypanosomiasis. Nigeria is an important case
study in various ways. As well as being Africa's most
populous nation, it has a large cattle industryc, and most
especially, it has often been considered to be ‘ground zero’
in the human drug quality problem. Particularly in the late
1990s and early 2000s, there was great concern at the ex-
tremely widespread drug quality problem (e.g. Erhun et al.
2001). Whilst some raised the alarm in the 1990s (Alubo
1994), the issue of drug quality only received sustained
government attention following the return to democracy
in 1999. As we shall see, quality problems with veterinary
drugs emerged over a similar period, though they have
received far less official attention.
The National Agency for Food, Drug Administration
and Control (NAFDAC) rose to promise as the agency
mandated to tackle this emerging problem, particularly
under the tenure of its former Director-General Dora
Akunyili (2001 to 2009). Indeed, NAFDAC has become a
celebrated ‘success story’ following vigorous enforcement
and public awareness campaigns (e.g. Raufu 2006). NAF-
DAC, however, has only recently begun to address the
veterinary drug sector systematically.
African trypanosomiasis is a parasitic infectious disease
present across a large area of West, Central and Eastern
Africa, a ‘tsetse belt’ that is named after the insect that is
the parasite's primary vector. There are a number of sub-
types of trypanosomiasis, one of which primarily affects
humans (Trypanosoma brucei gambiense) and another(Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense) that is zoonotic (cross-
ing between humans and animals). Referred to as ‘sleeping
sickness’ when present in humans, human African tryp-
anosomiasis poses a major public health threat in coun-
tries such as Uganda and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Other countries such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, Kenya
and Nigeria have largely controlled trypanosomiasis as a
threat to human health, but it remains a major livestock
disease (sometimes known as ‘nagana’ or ‘sammoré’),
affecting cattle especially, but also goats, sheep, camels
and various other mammals.
Trypanosomiasis exacts a major economic burden on live-
stock production as the parasite kills animals or retards their
growth and reproduction. Budd (1999) suggested that such
losses may be valued at as much as $4.5 billion per annum
across Africa. Although there is no vaccine, a number of
drugs, known as trypanocides, offer effective prophylactic or
curative treatment. These trypanocides ‘are probably the
most commonly used veterinary products in sub-Saharan
Africa’ (Geerts et al. 2001: 25), an impression affirmed by
distributors in Nigeria. Nonetheless, trypanosomiasis and
other livestock diseases are far from the only pressing
threats to pastoralist livelihoods in Northern Nigeria.
Since 2001, there has been a series of violent clashes in
Plateau State in both urban and rural areas. Although
such violence is often interpreted as stemming from
tension between Islamic Fulani pastoralists and Christian
agriculturalists, as Adam Higazi shows, this is only a
partial explanation at best. Instead, the violence emerges
from a complex interplay of factors, including ‘religion,
ethnicity and politics; socio‐economic disparities and
indigeneity; education; political leadership and ‘the youth’;
land and cattle’ (Higazi 2013: 3).
In 2010, during one such episode of violence, Dr. Ita
Umoh, a veterinary doctor, was killed during violence in
Vom, Plateau State (the home of the National Institute for
Veterinary Research). This event underscored the increas-
ing difficulty of working safely in rural areas of Plateau
State. Various vets currently or formerly based in Vom
(interviews in April, May and October 2014) pointed out
that whilst the high value of cattle meant that livestock
veterinary work remained potentially very profitable, secur-
ity concerns had led to a drastic reduction in the number
of qualified veterinarians working in rural areas. Whilst a
fuller account of violence in Plateau State is beyond the
scope of this article (see Okello et al. 2014 for related
discussion), it is important to recognise how these clashes
are both a threat to Fulani livelihoods and an aggravating
factor in their already-fraught relationship with the
Nigerian government, particularly at state and local levels.
Methodology
Important research is currently being carried out by the
Global Alliance for Livestock Veterinary Medicines
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TRYRAC to test the quality of trypanocides available
in various African marketplaces. This research aims to
complement these laboratory-based studies of the sub-
standard drug problem. In doing so, it aims to draw
out a series of structural and social issues that tend to
be sidelined in such studies. In particular, this means
describing the particularities of the Nigerian markets
and livestock owners and describing more generally the
means by which drugs are bought and sold. Following van
der Geest et al. (1996), this research adopts producing a
‘biography of pharmaceuticals’, that is, to trace how a par-
ticular class of drugs passes through each stage of a supply
chain to the end user.
In April and May 2014, interviews were conducted with
key actors at each step of the distribution chain - from
international importers, manufacturers and distributors
who trade in multi-million dollar quantities to rural cattle
owners who buy veterinary trypanocides from a rural
vendor in two or three $3 packets at a time. Specifically,
this involved meetings with importers, distributors, ven-
dors of various kinds, veterinarians, regulatory officials
and customers in Lagos, Abuja, Kaduna, Jos, Vom, Zaria
and Kano, as well as various villages and small towns in
the Bokkos Local Government Area in Plateau State. This
involved 32 interviews in total.
All participants were asked about their opinions and
experiences with trypanosomiasis drug quality problems.
For instance, drug vendors were asked about the steps
they took to procure good-quality products, whether their
customers had complained about the drugs they sold,
which products their customers preferred and why, and so
on. Similarly, cattle owners were asked about which trypa-
nocides they preferred and about the strategies they used
to mitigate the economic and animal health risks of poor-
quality drugs. Interviews with end users were supplemented
with two focus groups, each held in the Bokkos Local
Government Area with groups of around 12 herders. Most
of the meetings were conducted in English, though some
interviews and the focus group took place in Hausad. The
informed consent of all participants was secured. Many of
the issues discussed are sensitive, for example, when inter-
viewees are invited to comment on the trustworthiness of
their competitors or business partners. For that reason, I
have tried to balance explaining where people work and
who they represent, whilst preserving their anonymity.
The goal is not to systematically survey the market
(though this would be a viable area for future investigation),
nor is it to scientifically examine the drugs themselves (an
important step, but difficult to do at any scale whilst the
cost of testing the drugs remains high). Nor is the goal to
investigate and uncover the transnational sources and flows
of at least some problematic drugs (again, a viable but
separate project). Instead, I offer a ‘biographical approach’which aims to ‘study of transactions and meanings of
pharmaceuticals in diverse social settings’ (1996: 153;
see also Harper et al. 2011). Through understanding the
processes through which drugs are assessed, bought and
sold, issues of judgement, expertise and above all trust are
foregrounded as crucial parts of the supply chain.
A supply chain that crosses such diverse social and
geographical terrain, however, can only ever be studied
in part. I set out some salient contextual features that
enhance or attenuate the relationships between actors,
but these should not be assumed to be universal throughout
the varied contexts in which veterinary drugs are bought
and sold in Nigeria. Instead, they are intended to be exam-
ples of the broad range of social processes that regulate drug
transactions. This paper argues, therefore, that describing
these social processes is crucial for understanding the nature
of the drug quality problem, especially as they are usually
concealed behind the schematic terms ‘supply chain’ or
‘market’.The history of veterinary drug control in Nigeria
This paper argues that veterinary care practices have
emerged and continue in conditions of state abandonment.
Interviews with retired officials and researchers under-
scored that this abandonment was not always the case.
Lyons (2002) refers to trypanosomiasis as a colonial dis-
ease, emphasising that controlling the disease was a major
imperial priority (see also Tilley 2004). Despite various dif-
ficulties, particularly in terms of staffing, for institutions
transitioning to national rather than colonial status follow-
ing independence, many viewed the 1960s and 1970s as a
‘golden age’ for tackling trypanosomiasis. Not only were
widespread efforts to control the tsetse fly, the primary
vector of trypanosomiasis, effectively carried out, gov-
ernment veterinary services were able to offer a significant
range of services in rural areas. For example, the pre-
colonial and colonial system of taxation of the Fulani,
known as jangali, involved the government provision of
veterinary services as part of an implicit quid pro quo
(Adebayo 1995).
Respondents explained that whilst some veterinary drugs
were bought and used privately, until the 1980s, most
passed through an essentially closed state-administered
system that largely secured the authenticity and quality
of products. Cattle owners do not always recall the era
prior to the 1980s fondlye, as some recall that government
veterinarians would sometimes supply drugs and vaccines
on credit, only to seize the animals when bills went un-
paid. Nonetheless, cattle owners in the focus group par-
ticipants agreed that treatment was more reliable and
cheaper in those decades, as a tightly controlled and
subsidised supply chain left little room for substandard
products.
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this system of state veterinary drug administration began
to collapse, both in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa
(Leonard 1993). Perhaps ironically, the number of quali-
fied veterinarians in Nigeria actually increased significantly
during this period. However, as in much of Africa, such
vets became less likely to work in rural areas or in the
public sector, instead preferring urban, private practice
focussing on small animals and poultry (as discussed in
interviews; see also Babalobi 2007).
As the state abruptly withdrew from provision and of-
fered little in the way of regulation, the private sector
expanded in various guises. Some fake or counterfeit
products began to emerge in the late 1980s and 1990s. A
number of interviewees recalled the practice of simulating
the orange colour of Novidiumf with the soft drink Fanta,
whilst others described a process in which the caps worn
by Hausa men (‘dara’) would be dipped in water to extract
their dye, again to manufacture fake products of the ap-
propriate colour.
Despite the establishment of NAFDAC in 1993, the
Federal Ministry of Agriculture continued to be theoret-
ically responsible for the regulation of veterinary prod-
ucts in the 1990s. One senior official recalled how plans
were made for regional inspection teams and checkpoints,
but resource constraints prevented any real intervention.
Many interviews also noted that tackling the significant
outbreak of rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneu-
monia in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a major drain
on government resources. As one former official recalled:
‘the publically authorised veterinarians were not available
to give the routine treatment for [trypanosomiasis]. The
quacks and even the Fulani man took the syringe himself ’
(interview with a retired Ministry of Agriculture civil
servant, conducted in Zaria, 24 April 2014)
Drug quality issues in Nigeria therefore are enabled by
a series of domestic factors, with the deregulation of the
veterinary drug sector and the emergence of some fake
and falsified products over the last 30 years or so. How-
ever, all the respondents in this study reported that these
long-standing fake or counterfeit products were now less
common than a range of generic products which have
rapidly penetrated the market over the last ten years and
especially in the last five:
‘See them coming from India, China everywhere – they
are a big flood’ (interview, manager of a large regional
distributor based in Kaduna, 23 April 2014)
In the continuing absence of widespread testing of
veterinary drugs, the quality of these generic products re-
mains frustratingly uncertain. The consensus, however,was that such generics were by no means universally
poor, but rather uneven and unpredictable in quality.
By 2011, the Nigerian Veterinary Medical Association
(NVMA) and other veterinary organisations were raising
the alarm and demanding action. In particular, they insisted
that NAFDAC (which they noted already had both the ne-
cessary expertise and a legal mandateg) intervene. In April
2013, NAFDAC formed a Veterinary Medicines and Allied
Products directorate, based in Yaba, Lagos. Officers at the
new directorate reported that they were conducting a base-
line study to determine the prevalence of substandard or
unregistered products, due to be completed in 2014. This
exercise coincides with a moratorium or ‘grace period’ dur-
ing which enforcement will be postponed as information is
gathered.
Several officers at the new department reported that in
addition to veterinary drugs, unsafe pesticides (with their
potential to enter the human food chain) were seen as a
particular priority. Many actors in the supply chain were
pleased that NAFDAC was intervening. Several mentioned
that the employment of a significant number of veterinar-
ians (the lack of whom was a long-standing gripe amongst
Nigerian veterinary associations) would be an important
requirement.
Interviewees proposed various reasons why NAFDAC
had taken so long to become involved in this area, often
relating to internal and inter-agency politics and the
slow-moving nature of Nigeria's bureaucracy. The major
impetus for change appears to have been pressure from
bodies such as the NVMA, rather than lobbying from
cattle owners themselves, confirming other research sug-
gesting professional associations often act as important
brokers in Nigeria (Kingsley 2014). What is clear, however,
is that at least for two decades, a major threat to the liveli-
hoods of livestock owners has largely been neglected by
the Federal government.
Drug quality - different understandings, different
strategies
Despite clear agreement about the increased prevalence
of poor-quality drugs and the absence or at least sluggish-
ness of state assistance, other aspects of the substandard
drug problem are more controversial. In particular, the
exact nature of this problem is difficult, as it is experi-
enced differently from different social, structural and
geographical locations. From the point of view of cattle
owners, the problem is clear: treatment failure. One pas-
toralist in his mid-20s who was often sent by his family to
purchase drugs reported: ‘You may buy the drug from [a
nearby village shop] but after two or three weeks can see
nothing has happened’ (interview in Bokkos town, Plateau
State, 30 April 2014).
For importers, distributors and vendors, the problem is
seen in economic terms - the CEO of one major distributor
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business over the last four years (interview, Lagos, 15
April). Other regional distributors who dealt primarily
in well-known brand names reported similar losses.
There are also disagreements in the causes of the prob-
lem. Some argue that the ignorance of the Fulani is to
blame. As one distributor said:
‘They buy the wrong products, they buy poor quality
ones, they use them incorrectly. They are really hurting
their own animals.’ (drug distributor and vendor,
Kano, 28 April 2014)
Many also blamed the Nigerian government for ‘just
standing by’ whilst dubious generic products filled the
marketplace. Others, particularly those with veterinary
training, emphasised the issue of underdosing.
Regardless of where blame was apportioned, vendors
nonetheless used various strategies to build trust with
particular customers. They said that a common strategy
was to offer a customer a small amount of credit to buy
products (often just two or three sachets of trypanocide,
sold at N400 (£1.50) each) for the customer to test the
product. This act of placing faith in the customer to re-
turn and pay was both a gesture of goodwill and demon-
stration of confidence in the products sold. When such
debts were repaid, vendors reported that they would grad-
ually offer customers higher levels of credit, contingent on
further repayments. Perhaps because of the nature of
cattle ownership - with much wealth held in the relatively
illiquid form of livestock - the use of credit to build rela-
tionships of trust was particularly important.
In short, various traders and distributors see the drug
quality problem as a set of separate but overlapping is-
sues. Treatment failure reported by their disgruntled cus-
tomers and a rash of suspicious new products are evidence
of shortcomings in both drug quality and veterinary prac-
tice. Within the constraints of their business models - in
which small- to medium-sized vendors largely confined to
cities compete with opportunistic itinerant traders - they
are able to use certain strategies to build a reputation for
quality. Nonetheless, the largest burden of dealing with
substandard drugs of any actor in the supply chain fell on
the cattle owners.
Cattle owners' strategies for mitigating drug
quality issues
In interviews and focus group discussions in Plateau
State, many cattle owners said that ineffective treatments
for trypanosomiasis were a major issue, with one group
describing poor-quality trypanocides as the ‘number one’
(focus group in Maiyanga, Plateau State, 29 April 2014)
veterinary health problem they faced. The Fulani discussed
here are agro-pastoralists - though despite cultivatingcrops as well as keeping cattle, their livelihoods were
closely tied to the well being of their livestock. One
group reported that they commonly bought drugs from
a small vendor in a nearby village, or from mobile traders
who travel daily to different markets that are held on a
particular day of the week, or simply sell them by the side
of the road. Many distributors and veterinarians were es-
pecially suspicious of the ethics of these traders:
‘on the street, you see people with small baskets
selling drugs. These drugs have expired most of the
time, this man is taking his basket with drugs and
just selling them like they are bread.’ (interview with
an experienced practicing veterinarian, Zaria, 25
April 2014)
Cattle owners reported that these trypanocides brought
mixed results. Compounding the problem was that it took
several weeks for the effectiveness of a particular dose to
become apparent. This meant that when a drug seemed to
fail, by the time a customer returned to the point of sale
to complain, the particular batch of drugs at a shop or the
trader in question at a market had either moved on or
only worked on a particular day.
Whereas other work has emphasised the importance
of correctly gauging dosages based on animal weight
(Machila et al. 2008), the cattle owners in Plateau State
said they had not adopted this practice. Instead, they
administered a fixed dosage of 10 ml per adult animal
(or 5 ml for a calf less than two years old). Although a
non-standard approach, this seems a logical response: if
drug quality is frequently variable, why bother dosing
precisely?
To the dismay of the veterinarian who assisted me with
this discussion group, the cattle owners also reported an-
other non-standard practice: the simultaneous use of mul-
tiple trypanocide products from different product classesh.
Although in some cases, use of two different drugs
(known as a ‘sanative pair’, see Bouyer et al. 2013) is
recommended by veterinarians as a strategy against drug-
resistant strains of trypanosomiasis, it is not usually pre-
scribed as a first-line treatment option. Again, however, if
a cattle owner suspects that some of the drugs he has pur-
chased are ineffective, but has no way to be sure, a ‘belt
and braces’ approach of using the drugs together becomes
a potentially logical, albeit a risky one.
The key strategies, however, were the use of drugs in
small quantities and experimentation. The cattle owners
had adopted a practice of testing a drug on a small
number of sick animals first and then waiting to see the
result before buying more of the same product. It was
accepted, however, that this information would never be
perfect. As one member of the Fulani cattle owners ex-
plained, with broad agreement from his peers:
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back to the shop and buy more of the same kind. But
even that one, it might be different or expired. You are
just guessing.’ (focus group in Maiyanga, Plateau State,
29 April 2014)
That much livestock treatment is now carried out by
people without formal veterinary training is an issue that
has attracted much attention in recent decades (e.g.
McCorkle and Mathias-Mundy 1992; Leonard 1993).
Some African governments and non-governmental or-
ganisations have encouraged the use of ‘paravets’ or ‘live-
stock auxiliaries’ (Catley et al. 2004): professionals trained
with intermediate levels of knowledge, whilst others have
documented extensive forms of informal or ‘local’ vet-
erinary knowledge (e.g. Beinart and Brown 2013). Many
veterinarians in Nigeria and elsewhere, however, remain
suspicious of or even hostile towards such schemes, ar-
guing that an overreliance on partially trained staff brings
serious risks for animals and livelihoods.
The predominance of lay veterinary practices amongst
the Fulani in this study highlights two important issues.
Firstly, the incorrect administration of drugs can pro-
duce the same form of treatment failure as the use of
fake or substandard drugs. Secondly, it demonstrates
active innovation and experimentation on the part of
cattle owners to find veterinary health solutions in the
absence of formal, trained support, an issue to which I
shall return.
I asked why they did not travel to Jos - the nearest city,
around 90 min away by road - to buy drugs from a larger
retailer, where prices were likely to be cheaper and quality
more assured. Such communities are hardly isolated, not
least because many commercial drivers are themselves
Fulanii. This topic led to further discussion about the diffi-
culties of collective action:
‘You can give someone money to buy some small
things for you, but even if you know that [person] very
well, they may just run away with the money. And
what of the shop in Jos? They can decide to cheat you
as well.’ (interview with a Fulani cattle owner,
following focus group in Maiyanga, Plateau State,
29 April 2014)
Others mentioned that reluctance to pool cash made
other long-distance purchases - for instance, building
equipment - more difficult and expensive.
In summary, the cattle owners interviewed demonstrated
acute awareness of drug quality issues and had developed a
number of innovative strategies to address the problem,
most of which involved using small-scale transaction and
experimentation to mitigate risk. However, potentially ef-
fective collective action tended to be stymied by a lack oftrust between cattle owners and others, and between cattle
owners themselves. Furthermore, some of their dosing
practices are alarmingly similar to those that have encour-
aged drug resistance in other settings (Melaku and Birasa
2013: 87). I now turn to consider the structural market fea-
tures that engender this behaviour.
Markets, authenticity and weak states
Trade in other forms of fake and counterfeit products -
such as electronics and clothing - has tended to empha-
sise the performativity involved: for instance, in selling
products as genuine or the seeking out of products (such
as designer bags) that are sufficiently impressive facsim-
iles to confer status to the owner (e.g. Nakassis 2012;
Geiger-Oneto et al. 2013). The visual properties of lux-
ury goods mean that the products themselves broadcast
their authenticity (or, at least, their proximity as a copy).
In contrast, drugs are silent: inscrutable in uniform pack-
aging and tablets, powders and liquids whose potencies
are uncertain without expensive equipment.
The different actors described here read the packaging
differently in some ways: for instance, national and regional
distributors said that customers should look carefully at
the packaging to check expiry dates and the like, whereas
wary cattle owners pointed out that such packaging could
easily be switched or falsified. All agreed, however, that
it was often extremely difficult to reliably identify coun-
terfeit products, and all but impossible to identify in-
correctly stored ones.
With the inscrutability of the products themselves, and
the lack of a state authority able to reliably act as an arbi-
ter of authenticity, actors in the supply chain are left with
few options. An understanding of these options can be
informed by examining coping strategies in other similar
low-trust environments. In particular, Marcel Fafchamps
(2004) offers a useful framework for interpreting several
processes at work in this study. In particular, the emer-
gence of forms of assurance between vendors - such as
the form of interpersonal ties - is possible without a
state or professional body, albeit with increased trans-
action costs:
‘a certain level of economic efficiency in trade can be
achieved through purely private, decentralised and
informal means.’ (Fafchamps 2004: 170)
Fafchamps also notes the relative scarcity of large com-
panies, retailers and chains in many African markets, a
relevant observation for this study as small-scale retailers
predominate in the veterinary drug sector. For example, of
15 shops visited in Kano, Kaduna and Zaria, only 3 were
part of a franchise or chain, the remaining 12 being small
independently owned business. Only 1 of those 15 shops
employed a qualified veterinarian to provide consultations
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purely as being retailers, rather than offering additional
services. To use Fafchamps' distinction (2004: 9–15),
the small scale and narrow role of such shops suggest
that they are able to build trust, a bilateral tie between
themselves and their customers. However, almost all
retailers lacked the scale to build a public reputation -
that is, multilateral relationships with many customers
and potential customers.
Cattle owners who had formed a relationship with a
retailer felt more confident about the drugs they were
buying, but acknowledged that there were still risks:
‘Whenever I come to [Kaduna] to visit I see the same
Mallamj at that shop because I know he is very honest –
he will not give you the fake ones. But even he can be
cheated without being aware – he could be given the
expired [drugs] to sell and not even see [realise] it.’
(interview with a Fulani cattle owner in Bokkos LGA,
Plateau State, 29 April 2014)
Conversely, one discussion group reported that their
nearest drug vendor would sometimes sell apparently
ineffective products. They might withdraw their custom
temporarily, they said, but would usually patronise the
shop again eventually, albeit to buy a different product.
Thus, there are stark limitations on the usefulness of
gathering of information, when such knowledge may
quickly be found to be incorrect or out of date. This fe-
brile, uncertain situation where even honest men could
inadvertently sell poor-quality products or previously
trusted acquaintances could decide to cheat meant that
a constant strategy of risk avoidance was required. It
would be a mistake, however, to characterise this market-
place purely in terms of its shortcomings.
Furthermore, whilst Nigeria's veterinary drug market
has been largely unregulated for the past 25 years, the
negative label ‘unregulated’ only describes what the mar-
ket is not and says little about what it is. ‘Unregulated’
may imply a harmful ‘Wild West’, free-for-all or chaotic
system. Yet the actions of both distributors and vendors
bring a degree of order and certainty to this market. For
instance, large-scale importers were well aware that
many of the vendors they dealt with also traded cheaper,
generic products from other distributors. One importer
said that he had considered opening up and running dir-
ectly his own shops in two major cities:
‘I could do all [of this] myself, to take all of the profits.
But actually, you know, that would be a very
dangerous game – those ones who are my customers
now would be my rivals, you understand, and all my
eggs would be in one basket. Even if now, they are also
dealing with crooks, they are still my customers.’(interview with a Fulani cattle owner in Bokkos LGA,
Plateau State, 29 April 29 2014)
That is, instead of getting more directly involved in a
marketplace filled with uncertain and problematic prod-
ucts, he chose to minimise his risks by keeping a certain
distance. This cautious approach of sticking to known roles
rather than attempting to expand ambitiously - mirrored
by other actors further down the chain - is crucial: supply
chains that are seldom vertically integrated are an import-
ant way of minimising risk.
In short, animal health care and veterinary markets have
continued in this zone of state abandonment. As Majeko-
dumni notes, the Nigerian middle belt now has ‘generally
lower levels of disease than in the past as well as increased
access of herders to curative drugs’ (2011: 160). When
drugs are sold out of the back of a Toyota Starlet on cattle
market day, vendors are meeting a need for affordable and
locally available products. Thus, an economic system has
emerged that offers a solution - however imperfect - to
the much discussed ‘last mile’ problem that besets other
rural health services (e.g. Bhutta 2011).
Liberal economists have argued that inefficient African
states have been ‘a millstone around otherwise efficient
markets’ (Mkandawire 2001: 293). Regardless of the
broad applicability of this economic philosophy, it does
appear that the lack of veterinary regulation since the
1980s has indeed produced a system with some innova-
tive and efficient characteristics. Despite being low tech
and obscure, perhaps the trading patterns and informal
experimentation seen in cattle grazing areas of Nigeria
parallel other innovations which have taken place in the
absence of a strong state. For instance, East Africa's
mPesa system of mobile banking has flourished, over-
taking its equivalents in the West in part because it is
unfettered by cumbersome and restrictive regulations
(Atlantic 2014).
Implications for interventions
A nuanced assessment of veterinary marketplaces that
accounts for the difficult circumstances in which they
have emerged is an important precursor towards planned
interventions. Participants in this supply chain may in-
clude not only unscrupulous criminals who squeeze out
honest providers, but also imaginative suppliers respond-
ing to customers' demands and difficult circumstances
with innovation and efficiency. Therefore, characteris-
ing and tackling the drug quality problem as a criminal
enterprise with implied law enforcement solutions may
not be the most appropriate framing.
NAFDAC's strategies in tackling substandard human
drugs, commendable as they have been, have often tended
towards dramatic spectacles of seizures and prosecutions.
Should the new veterinary NAFDAC directorate be able
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sector, such an approach might have value. However, in
the case of trypanocides, the cost of testing drugs is ex-
tremely high - around €300 per sample at Senegal (personal
communication, Peter Jeffries, June 2014). Whilst the tech-
nical difficulties and cost of testing remains so high relative
to the value of the drugs, surely, the regulatory ability to
survey the market will remain limited.
Instead, an approach that emphasises training and en-
gagement alongside enforcement might be profitable for
NAFDAC and other relevant authorities. Indeed, certain
features of the marketplace should be favourable for such
efforts. For instance, the urban retailers visiting during the
course are closely grouped together in specific areas of the
marketplaces in Kaduna and Kano (and to a lesser extent
Jos). Their proximity (and evident familiarity with one
another) should make it relatively easy to convene for
training. A workshop might include identifying substand-
ard or expired products and offer advice on correct stor-
age practices. Should the authorities be able to build such
relationships, other activities such as compensated amnes-
ties for expired products or intelligence sharing regarding
sources of substandard projects might be possible and cost
effective. Convening or visiting rural and itinerant retailers
would admittedly require more effort and expense, but
their locations are nonetheless generally well known.
Importantly, such broad interventions would cut across
the mandates of multiple agencies and professions. As well
as veterinarians (who, despite being scarce in rural areas,
have the legal authority to prescribe and dispense drugs)
and NAFDAC, research institutions like the Nigerian
Institute for Trypanosomiasis and Onchocerciasis Re-
search and the National Veterinary Research Institute
are also important centres of expertise. Coordinating a
multi-agency effort appropriately is a significant polit-
ical challenge.
Cultural disconnections and opportunities
‘The Fulani man is so sneaky in whatever he does. He
has to trust you by some acts you have done to him to
confirm that trust.’ (interview with a senior veterinarian
based at the Nigerian Veterinary Research Institute,
30 April 2014)
‘There is also abuse of trypanocides by the Fulani
because of ignorance.’ (interview with a small drug
vendor, Zaria, 24 April 2014)
Whilst many drug vendors are relatively accessible as
targets for government or industry partnership, expand-
ing engagements with cattle-owning communities would
be a greater challenge. Aside from the broad geographical
distribution and sheer size of such communities, cultural
distance is also an issue. It is commonplace to hear urbanNigerians describe the Fulani in condescending terms. I fre-
quently heard such attitudes throughout the course of this
project (and indeed during previous research). The main
tropes for describing the Fulani are ‘backwardness’, ‘unedu-
cated’, ‘ignorant’, ‘stubborn’ and, less commonly, their ten-
dency towards violencek. Aside from the fact that such
cultural stereotypes are often unfoundedl, they reveal a cer-
tain level of unfamiliarity between the Fulani and urban
professional and policy-making elites. Even in otherwise
ethnically diverse Nigerian professional circles (especially in
national bureaucracies which must pursue a ‘federal
character’ of ethnic representativeness, see Mustapha 2007),
pastoralist communities are often absent or scarce.
Work such as this illustrates that, far from being
‘backward’ or ‘stubborn’ in this area, many Fulani are in
fact adaptable and innovative. Perhaps those in the gov-
ernment and industry would be able to better plan in-
terventions if they were more aware of such strategies
and perspectives. Pastoralist associations such as Miyetti
Allah would seem to be well placed to facilitate this. More
importantly still, cattle owners perceive the drug quality as
a subset of the broader problem of treatment failure. Per-
haps the fact that substandard drug problems are often
confused with other sources of treatment failure might
offer an opportunity for interventions, rather than an obs-
tacle to them.
Perhaps government- or industry-supported training
could address issues like diagnosis, injection procedures
and dosing practices at the same time as advising on
sourcing genuine products. Various schemes across
Africa (e.g. Allport et al. 2005) have proposed that com-
munity animal health workers can provide some level of
veterinary care in the absence of more formal, professiona-
lised services. In the specific area of this study, schemes in
the recent past offered short courses in veterinary training
to pastoralists at the National Veterinary Research Insti-
tute in Vom. However, these have ceased in recent years
because of ethnic-religious clashes in the region, with
Vom seen as an unsafe area for Fulani at the time this
fieldwork was carried out. Rebuilding the tenuous and
frayed ties between pastoralists, veterinary professionals,
the pharmaceutical industry and regulators should be an
urgent priority.
The use of credit in relationship building between
vendors and customers might also suggest another area of
potential intervention. Perhaps a microcredit scheme
of some sort could be used to incentivise the purchase
of genuine products.
Conclusion
The issue of substandard drugs is often shrouded in con-
fusion, frequently caused by competing definitions and
conceptions of the problem. In the case of Nigerian try-
panocides, most agree that fake and counterfeit products
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whose efficacy and provenance are difficult to judge. The
new attention paid to this problem by the regulator NAF-
DAC is a welcome development. However, the regulate-
and-enforce paradigm may not be entirely suitable in this
industry - a lasting solution will require a more holistic
understanding of and engagement with the problem. Both
global and local actors involved in combatting substandard
drugs should carefully consider the limits of ‘hard’ regula-
tion and the potential benefits of other approaches.
Regulators should be guided not only by laboratory ana-
lyses of products, but also by a clear understanding of how
drugs are bought, sold and used. Of particular importance
are the already-existing informal mechanisms that have
evolved independently of the state to mitigate the damage
of substandard drugs. The informal drug market, there-
fore, is more than just a malfunctioning, chaotic deviation
from a textbook ideal. The inscrutability of the drugs and
the uncertain causes of treatment failure, however, drive a
major flaw in these otherwise efficient supply chains and
markets as they inhibit reputation building and the forma-
tion of trusting relationships. Regulators should con-
centrate their efforts in resolving these specific market
failings, perhaps emphasising training-based strategies
that would enable market participants to make more
informed decisions.
Finally, one cannot ignore that the drug quality problem
is in part a consequence of political and economic aban-
donment. The structural neglect of the livestock sector
and pastoralist communities is an enduring characteristic
of Nigerian society. It is a neglect that has allowed the
withering of crucial animal health services as well as pain-
fully slow responses to readily apparent problems. It is also
a neglect that allows unhelpful misconceptions about the
practices of cattle owners to solidify - fallacies that must
be actively challenged. With momentum apparently now
building to tackle the issue of substandard veterinary
drugs in Nigeria, careful planning and research will be
required to carry out interventions that start to unwind
rather than perpetuate this neglect.Endnotes
aCattle in Nigeria are primarily owned by an ethno-
linguistic group known as the Fulani in Hausa and English
(though they themselves use the term ‘Fulbe’), who prac-
tise various forms of pastoralism or agro-pastoralism.
They are by no means the only owners of cattle or users
of trypanocides, but given their dominance of the cattle
sector, this paper emphasises their role as customers.
bhttp://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/
overview/en/.
cThe ‘rebasing’ exercise of adjusting Nigeria's economic
statistics which took place in April 2014 estimated thelivestock sector as being worth $8.66 billion in 2013
(National Bureau of Statistics 2014).
dThe researcher speaks basic Hausa but was assisted
by staff at the Nigerian Institute for Trypanosomiasis
and Onchocerciasis Research.
eThese insights emerged serendipitously during the
course of the discussion. However, a more systematic ap-
proach to collecting an oral history of cattle owners and
comparing it to insights from archival work would be an
extremely valuable addition to our understanding of this
period.
fA trypanocide containing the active ingredient homi-
dium chloride.
gThe Association published an open letter complaining
of the ‘Unjust and unfair exclusion of the Veterinary
Profession in the Management of Affairs of the National
Agency for Food, Drug Administration and Control’
(The Nation, 13 July 2011).
hThere are four classes of trypanocide widely used in
Nigeria: diminazene aceturate, homidium bromide, homi-
dium chloride and isometamidium chloride. All are
used curatively, and isometamidium chloride is also
used prophylactically (Majekodunmi 2011: 13).
iI am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for clarifica-
tions on this issue.
jMallam is a Hausa honorific with a similar meaning
to the French ‘Monsieur’.
kOf course, such mistrust may be mutual. Several Fu-
lani pastoralists expressed doubts about the quality and
good intentions of veterinarians: one Fulani retailer of
veterinary drugs in Bokkos town (interview, 30 April
2014) described rumours that some Christian veterinar-
ians might be deliberately trying to poison their cattle.
Although the retailer said he did not believe such ru-
mours himself, they nonetheless suggest a wider atmos-
phere of suspicion (see also Okello et al. 2014).
lTo choose just one example, Higazi (2013: 41) notes
that although in most areas of Plateau State it is com-
mon for the children of Fulani pastoralists to have lower
rates of school attendance and completion than other sed-
entary groups, there are a number of areas where these
measures are higher, as the Fulani are in places relatively
wealthy.
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